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IMPROVING THE JUROR
IMPROVING THE JURY SYSTEM
BY IMPROVING THE JUROR
T HE modern jury system had hardly been established in the
reign of Henry I' when it became subject to popular and pro-
fessional criticism. Much of the expressed dissatisfaction with the
jury system has been directed against the method of selection of
jurors, but the qualifications for jury service have also frequently
been reconsidered.! The responsibility for improving the quality
of jurors and for increasing the efficiency of the jury system is
fundamentally one resting upon judges and lawyers; whenever
administration of the jury system comes under attack, criticism
is generally directed towards these groups because of their inti-
mate connection with the functioning of the system.3 Judge Pound
of New York, commenting upon public dissatisfaction with the
trial jury, has cautioned the profession thus:
"Law tinkering still remains in the hands of lawyers and judges,
but the time may come when the people, wearied of rusty and creaking
mechanisms of courts, may arise to destroy it and install some plan
of administering justice more in keeping with an age of mechanical
power and speed."4
1 See Brown v. State, 62 N. J. L. 666, 42 At. 811, 813 (1899).
2See Crane, Judge and Jury (1929) 15 A. B. A. J. 201; FERaRI, CRIMINAL SOCIOLOGY
(1917) § 320; Mannheim, Trial by Jury in Modern Continental Criminal Law (1937)
53 L. Q. REV. 99; Mannheim, Trial by Jury in Continental Law (1937) 53 L. Q. REV.
388; PARMELEE, ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY IN RELATION TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(1922) 360; PARSONS, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL (1926) 203; Osborn, The Unfit Jurors
(1933) 17 J. AM. JuD. Soc. 113; Wilkin, The Jury, Some Reforms by Reversion (1927)
13 A. B. A. 1. 50; Legis. (1930) 30 COL. L. REV. 221; (1929) 13 J. AM. Ju9. Soc. 50.
"The reasons offered for saying that (the jury problem) is a problem for lawyers
and judges is that they are primarily most interested. When the institution for adminis-
tration of justice is strong the lawyers and judges get the credit; when it is weak they
have the blame." Richardson, The Jury and Methods of Increasing Its Efficiency (1928)
14 A. B. A. J. 410; See also Osborn, The Unfit Jurors (1933) 17 J. AM. Jun. Soc. 113.
4 See Osborn, The Unfit Jurors (1933) 17 J. AM. Juo. Soc. 113.
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Two aspects of the general problem of qualifications of jurors upon
which attention has been increasingly focussed seem worthy of
further consideration by the profession: (1) the inadequacy of
present intellectual and educational requirements for jurors; and
(2) the exclusion of women from jury service.
I
According to an analysis frequently offered in both the United
States and continental Europe,' a principal factor contributing to
ineffective criminal prosecution in jury cases is the two frequent
composition of juries with citizens of insufficient experience and
intelligence.' But if the ideal of Blackstone that a jury should be
composed of "sensible and upright jurymen" is often not realized,
the reasons for such failure apparently must be sought, in part at
least, beyond the provision of the jury-qualification statutes en-
acted in most American jurisdictions.
The Texas statutes relating to qualifications of jurors provide,
similarly to those of most other states, that jurors must be able
to read and write and must be of sound mind and good moral char-
acter.' The responsibility is placed upon the trial judge for deter-
mining whether these requirements are met by the prospective
jurors.' Although the language requiring literacy is hardly sufficient
in itself to guarantee jurors of adequate intelligence, the greater
difficulty would seem to be that the trial judges, in their application
of the standards thus prescribed, are confronted with factors which
. "The jurors, owing to their social standing and to the inadequacy of their intellec-
tual culture, are unable to decide difficult legal questions.., questions of fact may not
safely be left to jurors, inexperienced as they are in grasping the significance of the
evidence in more difficult cases." Mannheim, Trial by Jury in Modern Continental
Criminal Law (1937) 53 L. Q. REv. 99. "The jury system not only elevates incapacity to
the height of a principle, but celebrates incoherence .... " FEaI, CRIMINAL SOCIOLOGY
(1917) § 320.
e "The largest part of the injustices committed by the jury, comes in reality from its
ignorance .... PARMELEE, ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY IN RELATION TO CRIMXINAL
PRocEDURE (1922) 360. See also ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY (1929) 231.
7 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 2133; see Committee of National Crime
Prevention (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 690, 692,
TEx. CODE CrIM. PRoc. (1925) art. 621.
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so limit the availability of desirable jury material that effectuation
of the purpose of the statutes becomes almost impossible.!
Professional consensus in Texas seems to be that federal courts
are generally more successful in obtaining desirable jurors than
are state courts.' ° But inasmuch as the federal courts are required
to adopt the same qualifications for jurors as are ihe state courts,"
this disparity in quality of jury personnel does not necessarily
reflect a need for modification of the Texas statutes prescribing
standards of eligibility for jury service. Although the elevation of
such standards would undoubtedly be served by statutory provision
for a minimum educational attainment by all jurors, nevertheless
popular and professional satisfaction with federal juries would
seem to indicate that the quality of jurors in state courts can be
sufficiently improved without legislation establishing educational
qualifications if other factors contributing to the jury problem in
the state courts can be dealt with.
Perhaps differences in the quality of jurors in the state and
federal systems stem in part from divergent interpretations of the
"cross-section" theory of jury composition. In the case of Glasser
v. United States,' 2 the Supreme Court of the United States declared
that the jury should be a "cross section of the community" since
the "proper functioning of the jury system requires that the jury
be a body truly representative of the community." This has come
to be understood as meaning that any community is composed of
different segments based upon religious, racial and economic
groupings, and that each segment has men of intelligence and char-
acter from among whom jurors should be drawn.' If this principle
9 "The judges have the best opportunity to guage the quality of jurors.... It is im-
possible to believe that political timidity accounts for judicial indifference. It is more
likely the case that individual judges are busy and in most cities their courts do not
possess the organic powers that are necessary for responsible administration." (1929) 13
J. Am. JUD. SOc. 50.
"0 See Stayton, Report Upon Federal and State Jury Questionnaire (1938) 17 TEX.
L. REv. 62.
136 STAT. 1164 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 411 (1940).
12315 U. S. 60 (1942).
23 See Otis, Selecting Federal Court Jurors (1943) 29 A. B. A. J. 19.
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is followed, the "cross-sectioning" would be horizontal rather than
vertical, the jury thus being selected from the more intelligent of
each segment with no segment systematically excluded.
A second serious difficulty in the impaneling of capable juries
is the method by which juries are selected in the state courts. In
marked contrast to the method of selection in the state courts by
which clever defense counsel appearing before indifferent judges
can defeat the selection of highly competent jurors, the system em-
ployed in the federal courts is believed to facilitate selection of
jurors of reputed inlegrity and intelligence, even though the federal
courts follow the same statutory qualifications as those prescribed
for the highest court in the state in which they are sitting." In the
light of the experience of the federal courts, it seems clear that the
administration of jury selection can be improved by the legisla-
ture's providing for a more expeditious selection system'" which
would minimize the influence of counsel who place the interest
of the defense above the interest of the public in the functioning
of the jury.
Perhaps the major obstacle facing those judges who are sensitive
to the possibility of having more competent panels is the indiffer-
ence of those who are qualified to render intelligent service as
triers of fact."' Indeed, public apathy regarding jury duty is prop-
erly becoming a matter of professional concern. Judge Wilkin,
for example, has observed that
"The jury is an institution concerning which public thought and
sentiment seem to have crystallized or petrified. The busy citizen with
a sense of civic duty serves grudgingly when called; others, without
such a sense of duty, stretch their ingenuity and conscience to evade
service."'7
14 36 STAT. 1164 (1911 , 28 U. S. C. § 411 (1940).
';,Watkins, Selecting Jurors (1941 ) 48 W. VA. L. Q. 47.
10; See W oo AN D W ITE, CRnuIn. AND ITS TnFeATMeNT (1941) 425. "Most of the crit!-
cism. if not all of the criticism, of our jury system has come from those... who never
serve on the jury and who do nothing in a practical way to improve it." Crane, Judge
and Jury (1929) 15 A. B. A. J. 201.
17 Wilkin, The Jury: Some Retorms by Reversion (1929) 13 A. B. A. J. 50.
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However, until interested governmental or non-govern mental agen-
cies undertake systematically to insure an intelligent orientation
of the individual citizen with regard to jury responsibility, it
seems probable that the obstructive effects of such public aversit
toward jury duty will continue.
In view of such a tendency of qualified persons to seek excusal
from jury duty,"s it may be unfortunate that the legislature has
excluded at the outset groups of the better equipped members of
the community' who would add considerably to the intelligence
and competence of juries. A Texas statute provides that members
of certain professional and vocational groups may be exempt from
jury service if they so desire.2 ' Among such exempted groups are
teachers, ministers, physicians, newspaper publishers, druggists,
telegraph operators, and railroad agents and engineers, all pre-
sumably persons of good reputation and recognized ability. These
exempted groups, together with those men whose business and
professional interest allegedly would be interfered with by jury
service and who therefore are excused, constitute a substantial
portion of any community who never serve on juries. The inference
may well be drawn from the privilege of absence from the jury
panel thus conferred upon so many of the community's capable
citizens that the work of the courts in jury cases is not of sufficient
importance to warrant the employment of the best qualified citizens
as jurors." ' The insistence by the legal profession and society upon
the importance of capable and intelligent judges seems somewhat
incongruous with the willingness of the public to associate with
1 "So great has become the aversion to jury service according to the Cleveland Sur-
vey, that in many of the larger cities of the United States avoidance of jury service by
persons of means and intelligence has become traditional and it has become to be a kind
of mild disgrace for a 'respectable citizen' to allow himself to be called for jury service."
PARSONS, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL (1926) 203.
19 Ibid.
20 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. (1925) art. 2135.
"1 See Osborn, The Unfit Jurors (1933) 17 J. AM. Jun. Soc. 113.
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the judges, in the administration of justice, jurors other than the
most capable and intelligent available or with what one writer has
suggested is "a premium on ignorance and excluded intelligence"
from our jury panels.
If the social judgment is that nothing is of greater importance
than the doing of justice by men sitting in judgment on their fel-
low man,' then the legislative elimination at the outset " of most
of the material well qualified for this task seems to merit recon-
sideration. Certainly those exemptions which on their face are
reasonable and perhaps necessary because of public policy " should
be continued, for example, those with respect to persons of ad-
vanced age and attorneys. But in the final analysis other exemp-
tions are justified only if the performance of the function of the
exempted vocational or professional group is valued over the per-
formance of the jury function by those who may be best equipped.
Even so, it may be inquired whether the exemption of persons who
may from time to time perform a function thus preferred by society
should be granted in advance and without reference to the par-
ticular circumstances in which the prospective juror is situated
at the time of his call for jury service. For example, in the larger
cities of Texas in which the school systems have provided for sub-
stitute teachers, such substitutes might well be used whenever a
school teacher is called for the jury panel. Not only would such
an arrangement add to the character of the jury, but presumably
an occasional opportunity for jury service would aid teachers in
preparing their students for a more responsible citizenship. Per-
haps a revision of the present comprehensive exemption statute
could eliminate legislative encouragement of avoidance of jury
22 See Crane, Judge and Jury (1929) 15 A. B. A. J. 201.
23 Ibid.
"4 See PARSONS, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL (1926) 203.
25 See Hall v. Burlingame, 88 Mich. 438, 50 N. W. 289, 290 (1891).
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duty without precluding excusals whenever the exigencies of the
person called may require.
II
The popular issue presented by the denial to women of the right
to serve on juries in criminal cases in a number of jurisdictions has
again become a matter of current interest as a result of the recent
Supreme Court decision in the case of Ballard v. United States."'
In that case defendant, convicted in a federal court in California
of using, and conspiring to use, the mails to defraud, contended
that the intentional and systematic exclusion of women from the
jury panel in the trial court violated Section 275 of the United
States Code, which provides that jurors in federal courts shall
have the same qualifications as those of the highest court of law in
the state.27, California statutes provide that women are eligible
for jury duty."' In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court,
approving the statutory interpretation urged by defendant, held
that Congress contemplated that women should serve on federal
court juries in states in which they are eligible for jury service in
state courts. Although the Judicial Code contains certain exceptions
which permit federal jury service notwithstanding that the juror
would be disqualified for service in the state courts, none of these
exceptions related to the sex of the jurors.'
Whether women shall have a right to serve on juries is a com-
paratively new problem."0 At common law women were refused the
2r 15 U. S. L. WEEK (Dec. 9, 1946) 4049.
27 36 STAT. 1164 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 411 (1940).
- CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. (Deering, 1941) § 198.
29 Congress has prohibited disqualification of citizens from jury service on "account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." 36 STAT. 1165 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §
415 (1940). Congress has required that jurors be chosen "without reference to party
affiliations." 39 STAT. 873 (1917), 28 U. S. C. § 412 (1940).
30 Women have been excluded from jury service since the time of Henry 1II. See
(1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 134.
1947]
TEXAS LAW AND LEGISLATION
right " except in the rare case of a jury by matrons.3 2 Blackstone
states that at common law the jury consisted of "twelve good men
and true"" and accepted without discussion the then current under-
standing that the word "men" signified only members of the male
sex. " The common-law decisions referred to a juror as liber et
legalis homo, interpreting the word homo as including males only. 5
The common-law idea of jurors has been affixed to the word
"jurors" and to the concept of "trial by jury" in numerous Amer-
ican decisions on the ground that the meaning to be given to those
words is the meaning which prevailed in England and the colonies
at the time of the adoption of the United States Constitution. 36 It
seems, however, that the courts adhering to the common-law idea
of "male jurors" have failed to realize that women were excluded
from jury service at common law because they were then in a posi-
tion of political inferiority and were not recognized as the peers
of men. 7 Such an attitude today seems archaic. As one court has
observed, continued application of this common-law theory is
likely to present an anomalous situation incongruous with present-
(lay acceptance of women into business and social relations and
even into the life of the court room where "a woman on trial for a
crime might be brought to trial before a woman judge, prosecuted
by a woman district attorney, defended by a woman lawyer,
brought into court by a woman bailiff, and yet forced to a trial
"1 See Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343 (1897) ; Harland v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr.
131, 13 Pac. 453 (1887) ; 3 BL. COMM. *362.
.a._ See In re Opinion of the Justices, 237 Mass. 591, 130 N. E. 685 (1921). 2 BOUVIER,
LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1914) 1783, defines a "jury by matrons" thus: "Where preg-
nancy is pleaded by a condemned woman, in delay of execution, a jury of twelve dis-
creet matrons was called from those in court, who were impanelled to try the fact and
report to the court. On their returning a verdict of 'enceinte', the execution was delayed
until the birth..
::: 3 Bi.. CoMM. *349, 379.
A4 Id. at *362.
"'5 E. g., Hays v. Territory, 2 Wash. Terr. 286, 5 Pac. 927 (1884).
36 State v. Bray, 150 La. 103, 95 So. 417 (19231 : State v. James. 96 N. J. L. 132, 114
Atl. 553 (19211 : karland v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 13], 13 Pac. 453 (1887).
37 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 308 (1879).
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before a jury of men, because men only were considered eligible
for jury duty at common-law. '"'
Many courts, however, have argued that the preservation of the
jury as at common law does not necessitate continued acceptance
of the common-law qualifications of the jurors.' No particular
qualification of jurors has ever been considered to be among the
"essential and substantive attributes or elements of jury trial"
which have consistently been declared by the courts to be number,
impartiality, and unanimity. "The jury must consist of twelve;
they must be impartial and indifferent between the parties .. . "
Inasmuch as a majority of the states have enacted statutes which
ignore one or more of the common-law qualifications of a juror,41
it apparently was not considered niecessary for the adoption of the
common-law principle of trial by jury to preserve the jury pro-
cedure or the personnel qualifications required by historic prac-
tice."!
It has been accepted generally that the state legislatures have
the power to prescribe jury qualifications."' Such power has been
recognized in the legislative branch from the time of its exercise
by Parliament during the development of juries at common law."
The Texas Constitution provides that the Legislature shall prescribe
38 See In re Mana, 178 Cal. 213, 172 Pac. 986, 987 (1918) ; Little, Shall Women
Serve on Juries in Illinois? (1930) REP. IL. S. BAR Asso. 278.
39 State v. Rosenberg, 155 Minn. 37, 192 N. W. 194 (1923).
4o See Lohman v. Minneapolis Gas Light Co., 65 Minn. 196,68 N. W. 53, 55 (1896).
41 See State v. Chase, 211 Pac. 920, 923 (Ore. 1922).
42 ..... conceding that we adopted the system itself, or rather the principle of the
grand jury system, from the common law, that when we incorporated the system into out
!aws, we departed most emphatically from the lines which established grand jury
qualifications at common law." Parus v. District Court, 42 Nev. 229, 174 Pac. 706, 708, 4
A. L. R. 140 (1918) ; accord, State v. Hartley, 22 Nev. 342, 40 Pac. 372 (1895) (the only
element of the common-law jury adopted was the right of trial by jury).
43 Guykowski v. People, 2 I11. 476 (1838); McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320 (1883)
State v. Walker, 192 Iowa 823, 185 N. W. 619 (1921) ; Beatty v. Commonwealth, 91 Ky.
313, 15 S. W. 856 (1891) ; People v. Barltz, 212 Mich. .580, 180 N. W. 423 (1920) ; Com-
monwealth v. Maxwell, 271 Pa. 378, 114 Atl. 825 (1921).
44 See Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 271 Pa. 378, 114 Atl. 825, 828 (1921).
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the qualifications of grand and petit juries." The power thus given
the Legislature with regard both to the methods of selection and
to qualifications is limited only by the constitutional mandate that
the right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate."6 Additional restric-
tions have been placed on this and similar provisions in other states
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and by court interpretations of that amendment. However, the
Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to give women the
right to serve on juries."
In those states that require suffrage as a prerequisite to service
on juries, cases have arisen as to the effect of the Nineteenth
Amendment to the federal Constitution upon the disqualification
of women from jury service in criminal cases. The validity of
Texas jury statutes as affected by the woman suffrage amendment
to the federal Constitution was considered by the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals in the case of Glover v. Cobb,"s in which it was held
that the Nineteenth Amendment did not confer on women the right
to jury service, inasmuch as the right to vote and competency for
jury service are subjects distinct and different in nature, requiring
wholly separate legislative regulation. This attitude has been
adopted in many other jurisdiclions which have refused to hold that
a qualified elector is ipso facto entitled to jury service lest such a
45 TEx. CONST. (1876) Art. 16, § 19.
4,; Id., Art. 1, § 14.
47 The aim of the Fourteenth Amendment was to prevent discrimination on the basis
of race or color. The problem of discrimination against race or color is now well settled;
it has been established that the equal protection of the laws is denied to a Negro crim-
inal defendant, if through state action Negroes are deliberately excluded from thejuries. Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565 (1896) ; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313
(1879) ; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1879). The Fourteenth Amendment
applies to the action of state administrative officers, including judges, as well as to
legislative action. Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442 (1899). On this point, see also the
recent decision in Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 (1940). But the Fourteenth Amendment
does not apply to discrimination because of six. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162 (U. S.
1874) ; Harland v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 131, 13 Pac. 453 (1887) ; McKinney v.
State, 3 Wyo. 719, 30 Pac. 293 (1892).
4S 123 S. W. (2d) 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
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decision would preclude the legislature from prescribing any other
limitation upon the right to serve as a juror.'
The service of women on juries in Texas arguably could be per-
mitted under existing statutes without the necessity of legislative
reconsideration of the question. In some jurisdictions the provisions
of jury-qualification statutes requiring that the jury be composed
of "men" have been construed to mean "men" in the generic sense,
i. e., both sexes; and in such jurisdictions women, having become
electors, are admitted to jury service under the statutory provision
imposing jury duty on men who are qualified electors.' By thus
construing the word "men" in the generic sense, the courts have
not only overcome the obstacle of the common-law prohibition of
women from serving as jurors. They have also eliminated the basis
for any objection that the legislative power over jury qualifications
is being usurped, since a construction of the statutory language to
include women presumably carries out the legislative intent:"
The objections to the service of women on juries appear to a con-
siderable extent to be based tipon mere matters of prejudice." It
is claimed, for example, that they are too sympathetic and emo-
tional to be able intelligently to judge the guilt of the accused
and that they are too delicate to be confronted with the details
which must be considered in many criminal cases." It is true that
49 People v. Goehringer, 196 Ill. App. 472 (1915) ; State v. Walker, 192 Iowa 82.3,
185 N. W. 619 (1921) ; In re Grilli, 179 N. Y. S. 795 (1920,) ; State v. Mittle, 120 S. C.
526, 113 S. E. 335 (1922); Riddle v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. Rep. 548, 236 S. W. 725
(19221. Contra: Palmer v. State, 197 Ind. 625, 150 N. E. 917 (1926) ; People v. Barltz,
212 Mich. 580, 180 N. W. 423 (1920) : Parus v. District Court, 42 Nev. 229, 174 Pac.
706 (1918) ; Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 271 Pa. 378, 114 At. 825 (1921).
50 People v. Barltz, 212 Mich. 580, 180 N. W. 423, 12 A. L. R. 520 (1920) ; Browning
v. State, 120 Ohio St. 62, 165 N. E. 566 (1929).
51 People v. Barltz, 212 Mich. 580, 180 N. W. 423, 12 A. L. R. 520 (1920).
-2 See Little, Shall Women Serve on Juries in Illinois? (1930) RuP. ILL. S. BAn
Asso. 278.
53 With reference to the service of women on juries it has been said that "The
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life." Harland v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr.
131, 13 Pac. 453, 456 (1887). Also, it has been said that the service of women on juries
"must ... shock and blunt those fine sensibilities, the possession of which is [woman's]
greatest charm ... " See Turner, J., dissenting in Rosencrantz v. Territory, 2 Wash.
Terr. 267, 5 Pac. 305, 310 (1884).
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altogether too many criminal prosecutions involve salacious or
unpleasant subject matter; but changes in the education of women
and their participation on a basis of equality with men in activities
beyond the home have afforded them a psychological preparation
for jury responsibility which would have seemed unjustifiable a
half-century ago. Women today serve as jurors in criminal cases
in thirty-two states, 4 as well as in the role of judges and court
reporters; yet there has apparently been no apprehension in such
jurisdictions that exposure to the unattractive disclosures of the
court room has been attended by any of the undesirable conse-
quences anticipated by earlier judges, either for the "innate sensi-
tive nature" of the women who participate or for society generally.
Another objection to the jury service of women is based upon
the difficulties which could be expected to arise when a mixed jury
is compelled to remain overnight in a criminal case. Any such
difficulties, however, could easily be remedied by a legislative
enactment providing for separate quarters when such a situation
arises. Women jurors have also been opposed on the ground that
their domestic responsibilities should take precedence over activity
beyond the home. This objection has not been considered conclusive
in some states which permit excusal from jury duty at the discre-
tion of the trial judge; nor by certain other states which permit
women to serve if they so desire, without making jury service for
them mandatory.'"
Almost any community numbers among its population many
women of social intelligence and education unassociated with any
business or profession which might require their time. Their avail-
ability for jury service not only would add to the quality of the
'4 Those states which permit women to serve on juries in criminal cases are: Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada. New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin.
5 Those states in which jury service for women is optional are: Arizona, Arkansas,
Delaware, Idaho, Kansas. Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin.
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jury panel but would also facilitate the excusal of men for whom
jury service is unreasonably burdensome because of other responsi-
bilities. Jury service for women would thus benefit the community
by aiding the operation of the judicial process; moreover, it would
enable them to acquire useful information and experience as well
as interest in the functioning of government and insight into a
significant problem of their community.
Henry D. Schlinger.
